COFCapital One FinancialBearishCapital One Financial

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$COF - One thing I noticed digging through $COF that I don't see discussed much: Nobody at Capital One seems particularly interested in buying the stock. Over the last 12 months, 12 insiders have sold roughly $90M of COF stock in open-market transactions. Insider purchases? $0. Richard Fairbank, the CEO, sold roughly $37M in late October/early November. Peter Raskind, a director, sold another ~$339K on Nov. 6. And this isn't just one executive. Retail banking, banking & premium products, the general counsel, credit/risk executives and others have all been selling. Do you think they know something?

NeutralAXPAmerican ExpressAmerican ExpressCOFCapital One FinancialCapital One FinancialJPMJPMorgan ChaseJPMorgan Chase

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Trump wants a 10% cap on credit-card interest rates. The Senate has been pushing the same idea. Both are stupid, equally stupid. Let's use Capital One's Q3 2026 disclosures and run the numbers. For every $100 of average credit-card receivables, the annualized results look roughly like this: Net interest income: +$14.06 Other income: +$3.69 Credit-loss provisions: -$3.62 Operating expenses: -$8.59 What's left? $5.54 in pre-tax income. Now let's stress-test the proposed 10% cap. Capital One's consolidated funding cost was approximately 3.18%. Using that as a funding-cost proxy: 10.00% interest income 3.18% funding cost = 6.82% net interest income Keep the other income, credit losses and operating expenses unchanged: 6.82% + 3.69% - 3.62% - 8.59% Result: -1.70% pre-tax margin. That's an illustrative scenario, not a precise forecast. But it shows how quickly the economics can break. And this is before considering how underwriting, credit limits and customer mix would change. These are unsecured loans. Banks still have to fund them, absorb defaults, pay employees, run underwriting models, prevent fraud, maintain technology, handle compliance and service millions of accounts. I have no problem with criticizing excessive interest rates or demanding more competition. But proposing a 10% cap without addressing any of these costs is a different story. Trump and the Senate seem to think they can simply pick an interest rate and the entire industry will adjust around it. That's not how lending works. And you cannot cap away credit risk. If the economics no longer justify the risk, banks will stop lending to certain borrowers. And those borrowers are likely to be the ones with the fewest alternatives. Maybe spend some time reading a bank's 10-K before trying to run its credit business. $COF $JPM $AXP

MDLZMondelez InternationalBearishMondelez International

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I've been looking at Mondelēz $MDLZ and I like the business more than I like the stock at today's price. Oreo, Cadbury, Milka and Ritz are excellent brands. The distribution network is difficult to replicate, and I don't think the business is going away anytime soon. (The BTS limited edition flavor 🤌） But a few things caught my attention. Revenue has grown, yet free cash flow has barely compounded. Its five-year FCF CAGR was just ~0.5%. Net debt is still around $20B. And despite the latest earnings looking much better on the surface, Q3 GAAP operating income benefited from roughly $543M in commodity derivative gains. I wouldn't confuse that with underlying operating improvement. There's another detail worth watching: North American revenue grew 1.5% over the first nine months, while segment operating income declined 15%. That's not what I want to see from a business with strong brands and pricing power. At $66, I'm paying roughly 23x TTM free cash flow. That's not particularly compelling given the leverage and the uncertainty around normalized margins. My preliminary intrinsic value is around $52/share, with a more attractive entry point below $44. I like the company. I just don't like the price. A great brand doesn't automatically make a great investment. So MDLZ stays on my watchlist.

BRK-BBerkshire HathawayNeutralBerkshire Hathaway

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Why is everyone still buying $BRK.B at nearly $580? I'm genuinely curious. I understand the appeal. In a market where investors are increasingly uncomfortable (or scared..you can say that too I guess) with expensive technology stocks, AI valuations and concentration risk, Berkshire looks like a natural place to park capital. You get insurance, railroads, utilities, manufacturing, consumer businesses, a substantial equity portfolio and a ton of cash and Treasury bills. And Greg Abel is showing a greater willingness to deploy capital. Berkshire repurchased approximately $9.6B of its own shares in Q3 and another $2B in October. I also think investors are increasingly comfortable with the management transition. Buffett may no longer be CEO, but Berkshire's underlying culture and capital allocation philosophy haven't suddenly disappeared. So I understand why people want to own it. But here's where I'm struggling. Berkshire's Q3 operating earnings declined 6% YoY to approximately $12.7B. GEICO's pretax underwriting earnings fell roughly 45%. Some of its consumer and retail businesses are experiencing weaker demand. McLane is under pressure, and I'm still trying to understand what normalized returns on the OxyChem acquisition will look like. Meanwhile, BNSF and BHE are performing reasonably well, and the balance sheet remains exceptional. It's a mixed operating picture, not some extraordinary acceleration in underlying earnings. What makes the valuation particularly interesting is that Berkshire is now trading around $580, compared with the roughly $400 level where I found the investment considerably more compelling. That's a 45% increase. Has the intrinsic value of Berkshire increased by 45% over that period? I'm not convinced. I understand that the market is assigning a premium to Berkshire's liquidity, resilience and ability to capitalize on a market dislocation. But that optionality isn't free. That huge cash pile is already part of the balance sheet. The insurance float is valuable, but it isn't free equity capital. And a collection of wonderful businesses doesn't automatically justify any purchase price. I actually WANT to own Berkshire during the next major market panic. And I am still owning it at this very moment. The irony is that the more investors buy Berkshire as a safe haven, the less attractive its entry price becomes. I'm not bearish on the business. I'm just having a harder time getting excited about the stock at this valuation. Am I missing something? Are investors primarily buying Berkshire for its intrinsic value, its defensive characteristics, or simply because they don't know where else to put their money? I'd genuinely like to hear the other side of this argument.

DASHDoorDashNeutralDoorDash

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$M $DASH Not gonna lie…I like the idea… DoorDash is really getting creative these days. https://t.co/8s5IT1h1tq