Long River Holding

$PBR.A Why is the market so bearish about this? Petrobras itself reports $52.799 billion of last-twelve-month adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and $40.667 billion of last-twelve-month operating cash flow at June 30, 2026. That is the first number I find interesting. 3.6 times adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization is interesting. Petrobras also expects peak oil production of approximately 2.7 million barrels per day in 2028 and peak total oil and gas production of approximately 3.4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2028–2029. The company also has 12.112 billion barrels of proved reserves under United States Securities and Exchange Commission definitions at December 31, 2025, and 12.5 billion barrels under Brazilian/Society of Petroleum Engineers criteria. The company’s 2026–2030 plan projects enough free cash flow to support approximately $45–50 billion of ordinary dividends over the period. Under a conservative discounted cash-flow framework, the current price is broadly consistent with approximately $60–$70 Brent depending on the required return. So, the question is not whether Petrobras is a good business at $70 Brent. The question is: what is the market pricing in? At roughly 3.6x LTM adjusted EBITDA, with substantial operating cash flow, growing production, a large proved reserve base, and a plan that can generate significant cash even around $70 Brent, the valuation appears to be discounting a fairly demanding combination of lower oil prices, political intervention, weaker capital allocation, or some combination of the three. That is the part I want to underwrite. Petrobras is not a risk-free compounder. It is a commodity producer controlled by the Brazilian state, and the historical record gives investors legitimate reasons to demand a discount. But at this valuation, the interesting question is no longer “why is Petrobras risky?” We already know why. The interesting question is whether the market is pricing in too much risk. That is where $PBR.A gets interesting.

$BABA After going through Alibaba’s Fiscal Year 2026 annual report and the June 2026 quarter results, I think Alibaba is becoming a much more interesting investment than the simple “Chinese internet stock is cheap” thesis suggests. But I also think investors need to demand a substantially higher margin of safety here than they would for a comparable United States company, or $JD $PDD The reason I am interested is not just valuation. It is the combination of a still very large commerce business, a massive net cash position, a rapidly growing cloud business, and an increasingly credible artificial intelligence ecosystem built around Qwen. The June quarter was particularly interesting. Alibaba Cloud and Compute Services generated RMB48.4 billion of revenue, up 45% year over year. Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization reached roughly RMB5.6 billion, up 133%. More importantly, artificial-intelligence-related products generated RMB12.4 billion of Cloud revenue in the quarter, representing roughly 35% of external Cloud revenue. Alibaba says artificial-intelligence-related product revenue has now grown at triple-digit rates for twelve consecutive quarters. That changes my perception of the artificial intelligence thesis. This is no longer simply: “Alibaba is spending money on Qwen and maybe someday artificial intelligence will become a business.” The infrastructure layer is already becoming a real business. Cloud is growing rapidly, generating operating profit, and artificial intelligence is becoming an increasingly important driver of that growth. Then there is the other side of the equation. Alibaba’s artificial intelligence applications business is still losing a lot of money. The Artificial Intelligence Labs and Applications segment generated only about RMB3.3 billion of revenue in the June quarter but recorded an adjusted operating loss of roughly RMB13.9 billion. That’s enormous. So I would not capitalize Qwen as if it were already a profitable software company. Right now I view Qwen as an option. Alibaba is essentially using its existing balance sheet and Cloud infrastructure to build a potentially enormous artificial intelligence application ecosystem. That creates an interesting structure: Cloud is becoming the economic engine. Qwen is the investment. If Qwen eventually monetizes, Alibaba has the ability to capture value across the stack: chips → Cloud → models → agents → applications → commerce. That is something I don’t think the market should completely ignore. And Alibaba has the balance sheet to pursue it. At the end of June, Alibaba reported roughly RMB474.5 billion of cash and other liquid investments and approximately RMB208 billion of net cash after debt. That gives the company a huge amount of strategic flexibility. But this is where I become much more cautious. Alibaba spent roughly RMB67.7 billion on capital expenditures in the June quarter, up approximately 75% year over year. That is not a small investment cycle. Artificial intelligence infrastructure is incredibly capital intensive, and there is no guarantee that today’s spending will produce tomorrow’s returns. This is why I don’t want to value Alibaba based on revenue growth or artificial intelligence excitement. I want to know what ultimately becomes free cash flow. The second issue is the core commerce business. $PDD Holdings still has superior operating economics. PDD’s latest quarter produced roughly RMB112 billion of revenue and RMB27.8 billion of operating income, an operating margin around 25%. Alibaba’s E-commerce Group is also an excellent business, but its economics are currently being pressured by aggressive investment in quick commerce and user experience. So if I were simply buying the highest-quality marketplace business, I would probably choose PDD. Alibaba is interesting for a different reason. I think Alibaba potentially offers a better sum-of-the-parts opportunity. You are getting: a massive China commerce platform international commerce Alibaba Cloud Qwen artificial intelligence infrastructure semiconductor capabilities a huge balance sheet substantial investment assets continued share repurchases all inside one company. The market does not necessarily need Qwen to become the next ChatGPT for the investment to work. If the existing commerce business and Cloud business alone justify most of the current valuation, then Qwen becomes genuine upside rather than something I am paying full price for. That is the setup I want. But there is an additional discount that I think is absolutely necessary. Alibaba carries substantially more political and geopolitical risk than a comparable United States company. This isn’t theoretical. United States policy toward Chinese technology companies can change the addressable market, access to advanced semiconductors, capital-market access, institutional ownership, and ultimately the valuation multiple investors are willing to assign. Alibaba and other Chinese technology companies can also face restrictions, sanctions-related exposure, export controls, investment restrictions, or inclusion on various United States government lists depending on policy decisions. Even when the underlying business remains fundamentally healthy, the market can assign a lower multiple simply because the probability distribution around the future is wider. That matters enormously for valuation. I therefore don’t think Alibaba deserves the same margin of safety as a company like Copart or Berkshire Hathaway. If I estimate intrinsic value at $150 per American depositary share, I don’t want to pay $140 and tell myself I’m getting a margin of safety. For Alibaba, I would want a much wider buffer. Something closer to a 25–35% discount to my conservative intrinsic value would make much more sense to me. There are simply more things that can go wrong that have nothing to do with Alibaba’s underlying operating performance. That is the key distinction. I can be bullish on Alibaba’s business while still demanding a pessimistic valuation. In fact, I think that’s exactly how Alibaba should be approached. My current comparison is roughly: PDD = better current operating economics. Alibaba = better sum-of-the-parts and artificial intelligence optionality. $JD = simpler physical commerce and logistics turnaround, but structurally lower-margin economics. If I had to own one purely because I loved the business today, I would probably pick PDD. If I had to own one because I thought the market was mispricing a collection of assets, I would pick Alibaba. And if Alibaba becomes cheap enough, I think the combination of net cash, mature commerce, Cloud growth and Qwen optionality could become very asymmetric. But I am not willing to pay a normal technology-company multiple for that optionality. I want the existing business to protect me. I want Cloud growth to prove that artificial intelligence investment can eventually produce high-return capital. I want Qwen to demonstrate monetization rather than simply user growth. And I want enough valuation discount to compensate me for China, United States geopolitical, regulatory, semiconductor, accounting and capital-allocation risks. So my Alibaba thesis is not: “Alibaba is going to dominate artificial intelligence.” It is: “Alibaba already owns a massive ecosystem that can generate significant economic value without Qwen succeeding. Meanwhile, Cloud and artificial intelligence are creating a potentially enormous second earnings engine. If I can buy that combination at a sufficiently large discount to conservative intrinsic value, I don’t need everything to go right.” That’s the kind of asymmetry I’m looking for. The next step for me is therefore not deciding whether Alibaba is a great company. It is determining exactly what I am paying for each piece. China commerce. International commerce. Cloud. Qwen and artificial intelligence. Investments. Net cash. Then I want to run bear, base and bull cases and apply a genuinely large margin of safety for the geopolitical risk. If the conservative case still produces an attractive return, then I think Alibaba becomes very interesting. If the investment only works under a successful Qwen, strong Chinese consumption, continued Cloud growth and a higher valuation multiple, then I don’t think the margin of safety is there. That’s the distinction I care about.

$VST I’ve been digging deeper into Vistra, and I think the market is looking at the company too narrowly. The obvious thesis is “Texas + artificial intelligence + nuclear.” I think the real thesis is much more interesting. Vistra is becoming a North American power scarcity platform. (North American, FYI) The company already owns roughly 44 gigawatts of generation capacity and serves roughly 5 million retail customers across 16 states and the District of Columbia. This isn’t a company waiting for the electricity buildout to happen. It already owns the assets. And that matters because electricity demand is changing after years of relatively stagnant growth. Data centers are the obvious driver, but they’re not the only one. Industrial reshoring, semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles, oil-field electrification and population growth are all adding load. And even without AI, these restoring demand would still be material enough. The problem is that electricity supply doesn’t appear overnight. You need land. You need permits. You need transmission. You need generation. And increasingly, you need reliable generation that can operate when the grid actually needs it. That’s where Vistra gets interesting. The first-half 2026 numbers are already showing the operating leverage. Revenue increased 18% year over year to $9.7 billion. Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization increased roughly 26% to $3.3 billion. Operating cash flow nearly doubled to $2.2 billion. The Texas business was particularly strong, with adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization up roughly 42%. The eastern United States was even stronger, up roughly 55%. This isn’t a story where everything depends on some distant artificial-intelligence forecast. The cash is already showing up. And cash flow is the number I care about most with Vistra. Reported net income can be extremely noisy because of the company’s long-dated hedges and the resulting unrealized gains and losses. During the second quarter, for example, Vistra took a substantial unrealized hedge loss even though those contracts settle over future periods. So I care much more about the underlying cash generation. For 2026, management expects $3.9–4.7 billion of adjusted free cash flow before growth. The midpoint is roughly $4.3 billion. At today’s market capitalization of roughly $48 billion, that’s about 11x expected 2026 adjusted free cash flow before growth. I don’t think that’s an expensive valuation for this asset base. It’s also worth looking at the balance sheet. Vistra still has substantial debt, roughly $19.6 billion of long-term debt at the end of the second quarter. That’s the biggest reason I wouldn’t value this like a software company. But the balance sheet is improving. Liquidity was roughly $6.3 billion, and Standard & Poor’s and Fitch both moved Vistra into investment-grade territory this year. Management has also indicated that leverage is approaching the low two-times range. So I see the balance sheet as a risk, but increasingly a manageable one rather than a thesis breaker. Another thing I like is the visibility into future generation economics. As of August, Vistra had hedged roughly 100% of expected 2026 generation, 94% of 2027 generation and 72% of 2028 generation. This is important. I’m not buying a pure merchant-power lottery ticket and hoping electricity prices stay high forever. A substantial portion of the future economics is already locked in. The nuclear portfolio is another part of the thesis I think the market underappreciates. Vistra has long-term power purchase agreements involving roughly 3.8 gigawatts of nuclear capacity at Comanche Peak with Amazon Web Services. It also has nuclear agreements with Meta involving its eastern United States facilities. That’s significant because large technology companies don’t just need electricity. They need reliable electricity. Twenty-four hours a day. Seven days a week. And nuclear is one of the few existing generation technologies capable of providing that at scale without carbon emissions. Then there’s Texas. Don't get me wrong. Texas is still the center of the thesis. The state is seeing rapid electricity demand growth from data centers, industrial activity and oil-field electrification. Vistra already owns substantial generation there. Its Texas adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization increased roughly 42% during the first half of 2026. And Vistra continues adding generation. Its Permian Power subsidiary recently entered into a $583 million Texas Energy Fund loan for an 860-megawatt natural-gas peaking plant in West Texas. That is exactly the kind of flexible generation that becomes valuable when industrial electricity demand grows faster than the grid can respond. But the part I find really interesting is what happens beyond Texas. I’ve seen people describe Vistra as having control over northern Mexico’s electricity market. That’s not accurate. Vistra doesn’t own northern Mexico’s grid, and Mexico isn’t currently a major Vistra earnings segment. But I think there is a much more defensible version of the thesis. Northern Mexico is becoming an increasingly important manufacturing hub. Monterrey, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas are benefiting from nearshoring and manufacturing investment. All of that industrial activity requires electricity. Texas and northern Mexico are already physically interconnected through asynchronous electricity connections. So imagine a world where industrial electricity demand in northern Mexico grows faster than Mexico can build reliable generation and transmission. Texas generation becomes strategically more valuable. And Vistra is sitting on the Texas side of that corridor with a large existing generation fleet. I’m not assuming this becomes a huge Vistra revenue stream. I view it as an option. The core thesis works without Mexico. If it develops, it’s upside. Then there’s Helix. Vistra committed up to $1 billion to a partnership with KKR’s Helix Fund to pursue opportunities involving hyperscale data centers, generation, transmission and related infrastructure. I think this could become increasingly important. Vistra doesn’t necessarily need to own the data center. If electricity becomes the bottleneck, owning the power infrastructure can be just as valuable. That’s the bigger picture I’m seeing. Vistra isn’t simply selling electricity. It’s increasingly positioning itself around the infrastructure required to supply reliable electricity to some of the fastest-growing sources of demand in North America. So why is the stock down? Because expectations got ridiculous. The market went from treating Vistra like a normal power company to treating it like the ultimate artificial-intelligence electricity trade. Now investors are questioning artificial-intelligence capital spending, data-center construction timelines, future power prices and whether the enormous earnings growth of the last few years can continue. Those are legitimate concerns. I don’t think Vistra deserves an unlimited multiple. It’s capital intensive. It has meaningful debt. Wholesale electricity prices are cyclical. And the 2027 growth rate is unlikely to look anything like the 2026 growth rate. But that’s precisely why I’m more interested around $142 than I was around $170–200. The stock doesn’t need another massive re-rating for the investment to work. At roughly 11x expected 2026 adjusted free cash flow before growth, I’m paying a reasonable price for an existing power generation business with strong current cash generation. Then I get the optionality from nuclear. Texas. Data centers. Industrial electrification. Long-term power purchase agreements. Additional generation. And potentially, over time, increasing electricity demand across the Texas–northern Mexico industrial corridor. My framework is pretty simple. Around $140, I’m comfortable buying. Around $130, I become much more interested. Around $120–125, assuming the fundamentals haven’t deteriorated, I’d consider it a very high-conviction opportunity. The key is that I’m not betting that artificial intelligence saves Vistra. I’m betting that reliable electricity becomes increasingly valuable across North America. And Vistra already owns a lot of the infrastructure required to provide it. That’s a much more durable thesis. I am happy with my position and will hold for observation. Onto the next one. :)

$VST I’ve been digging deeper into Vistra, and I think the market is looking at the company too narrowly. The obvious thesis is “Texas + artificial intelligence + nuclear.” I think the real thesis is much more interesting. Vistra is becoming a North American power scarcity platform. (North American, FYI) The company already owns roughly 44 gigawatts of generation capacity and serves roughly 5 million retail customers across 16 states and the District of Columbia. This isn’t a company waiting for the electricity buildout to happen. It already owns the assets. And that matters because electricity demand is changing after years of relatively stagnant growth. Data centers are the obvious driver, but they’re not the only one. Industrial reshoring, semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles, oil-field electrification and population growth are all adding load. And even without AI, these restoring demand would still be material enough. The problem is that electricity supply doesn’t appear overnight. You need land. You need permits. You need transmission. You need generation. And increasingly, you need reliable generation that can operate when the grid actually needs it. That’s where Vistra gets interesting. The first-half 2026 numbers are already showing the operating leverage. Revenue increased 18% year over year to $9.7 billion. Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization increased roughly 26% to $3.3 billion. Operating cash flow nearly doubled to $2.2 billion. The Texas business was particularly strong, with adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization up roughly 42%. The eastern United States was even stronger, up roughly 55%. This isn’t a story where everything depends on some distant artificial-intelligence forecast. The cash is already showing up. And cash flow is the number I care about most with Vistra. Reported net income can be extremely noisy because of the company’s long-dated hedges and the resulting unrealized gains and losses. During the second quarter, for example, Vistra took a substantial unrealized hedge loss even though those contracts settle over future periods. So I care much more about the underlying cash generation. For 2026, management expects $3.9–4.7 billion of adjusted free cash flow before growth. The midpoint is roughly $4.3 billion. At today’s market capitalization of roughly $48 billion, that’s about 11x expected 2026 adjusted free cash flow before growth. I don’t think that’s an expensive valuation for this asset base. It’s also worth looking at the balance sheet. Vistra still has substantial debt, roughly $19.6 billion of long-term debt at the end of the second quarter. That’s the biggest reason I wouldn’t value this like a software company. But the balance sheet is improving. Liquidity was roughly $6.3 billion, and Standard & Poor’s and Fitch both moved Vistra into investment-grade territory this year. Management has also indicated that leverage is approaching the low two-times range. So I see the balance sheet as a risk, but increasingly a manageable one rather than a thesis breaker. Another thing I like is the visibility into future generation economics. As of August, Vistra had hedged roughly 100% of expected 2026 generation, 94% of 2027 generation and 72% of 2028 generation. This is important. I’m not buying a pure merchant-power lottery ticket and hoping electricity prices stay high forever. A substantial portion of the future economics is already locked in. The nuclear portfolio is another part of the thesis I think the market underappreciates. Vistra has long-term power purchase agreements involving roughly 3.8 gigawatts of nuclear capacity at Comanche Peak with Amazon Web Services. It also has nuclear agreements with Meta involving its eastern United States facilities. That’s significant because large technology companies don’t just need electricity. They need reliable electricity. Twenty-four hours a day. Seven days a week. And nuclear is one of the few existing generation technologies capable of providing that at scale without carbon emissions. Then there’s Texas. Don't get me wrong. Texas is still the center of the thesis. The state is seeing rapid electricity demand growth from data centers, industrial activity and oil-field electrification. Vistra already owns substantial generation there. Its Texas adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization increased roughly 42% during the first half of 2026. And Vistra continues adding generation. Its Permian Power subsidiary recently entered into a $583 million Texas Energy Fund loan for an 860-megawatt natural-gas peaking plant in West Texas. That is exactly the kind of flexible generation that becomes valuable when industrial electricity demand grows faster than the grid can respond. But the part I find really interesting is what happens beyond Texas. I’ve seen people describe Vistra as having control over northern Mexico’s electricity market. That’s not accurate. Vistra doesn’t own northern Mexico’s grid, and Mexico isn’t currently a major Vistra earnings segment. But I think there is a much more defensible version of the thesis. Northern Mexico is becoming an increasingly important manufacturing hub. Monterrey, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas are benefiting from nearshoring and manufacturing investment. All of that industrial activity requires electricity. Texas and northern Mexico are already physically interconnected through asynchronous electricity connections. So imagine a world where industrial electricity demand in northern Mexico grows faster than Mexico can build reliable generation and transmission. Texas generation becomes strategically more valuable. And Vistra is sitting on the Texas side of that corridor with a large existing generation fleet. I’m not assuming this becomes a huge Vistra revenue stream. I view it as an option. The core thesis works without Mexico. If it develops, it’s upside. Then there’s Helix. Vistra committed up to $1 billion to a partnership with KKR’s Helix Fund to pursue opportunities involving hyperscale data centers, generation, transmission and related infrastructure. I think this could become increasingly important. Vistra doesn’t necessarily need to own the data center. If electricity becomes the bottleneck, owning the power infrastructure can be just as valuable. That’s the bigger picture I’m seeing. Vistra isn’t simply selling electricity. It’s increasingly positioning itself around the infrastructure required to supply reliable electricity to some of the fastest-growing sources of demand in North America. So why is the stock down? Because expectations got ridiculous. The market went from treating Vistra like a normal power company to treating it like the ultimate artificial-intelligence electricity trade. Now investors are questioning artificial-intelligence capital spending, data-center construction timelines, future power prices and whether the enormous earnings growth of the last few years can continue. Those are legitimate concerns. I don’t think Vistra deserves an unlimited multiple. It’s capital intensive. It has meaningful debt. Wholesale electricity prices are cyclical. And the 2027 growth rate is unlikely to look anything like the 2026 growth rate. But that’s precisely why I’m more interested around $142 than I was around $170–200. The stock doesn’t need another massive re-rating for the investment to work. At roughly 11x expected 2026 adjusted free cash flow before growth, I’m paying a reasonable price for an existing power generation business with strong current cash generation. Then I get the optionality from nuclear. Texas. Data centers. Industrial electrification. Long-term power purchase agreements. Additional generation. And potentially, over time, increasing electricity demand across the Texas–northern Mexico industrial corridor. My framework is pretty simple. Around $140, I’m comfortable buying. Around $130, I become much more interested. Around $120–125, assuming the fundamentals haven’t deteriorated, I’d consider it a very high-conviction opportunity. The key is that I’m not betting that artificial intelligence saves Vistra. I’m betting that reliable electricity becomes increasingly valuable across North America. And Vistra already owns a lot of the infrastructure required to provide it. That’s a much more durable thesis. I am happy with my position and will hold for observation. Onto the next one. :)

Added $VST and $EWZ and $LULU. But will pause for now. Cash reserve still stays within $SGOV for now. This whole Dario Anthropic IPO drama + private credit default + high oil price combo isn’t the most clear trend I’ve been waiting for.

$MELI I will begin to add this and might make it a core position. I don't think it is an "early-stage" hyper-growth story taking speculative bets anymore. On the contrary, it is a scaled ecosystem compounding at scale. Combining a marketplace, a proprietary logistics network, and a digital financial institution, MELI functions as the digital infrastructure of Latin America. To begin with, its full-year 2025 revenue reached $28,850 million (up 39.1% YoY), and Q2 2026 marked the first single quarter over $10 billion in revenue ($10,169 million, up 50% YoY). Founder-led management continues to reinvest operating cash flows into high-ROIC projects rather than financial engineering, keeping diluted share count flat at 50,697,182 shares. (which I like it very much) From a logistics standpoint, it generated $21.9 billion in GMV in Q2 2026 alone. Over 77% of fast-shipment orders across Latin America are delivered within 48 hours via Mercado Envíos. High order density in Brazil and Mexico keeps unit fulfillment costs below competitor levels. Unique active buyers expanded 26% YoY in Q2 2026 to 89 million, with items per buyer increasing 14% YoY. From a credit perspective, their credit book scaled to >$16 billion. Management shifted underwriting upmarket, holding 15–90 day credit card NPLs at 4.6% and total portfolio NPLs at 7.0%. Users engaged in both commerce and fintech ("ecosystemic users") generate 70% more GMV and 90% more TPV than single-product users. $AMZN has been trying to compete within the same area but I don't think they are getting any near-term success. Amazon’s global playbook did not translate directly to Latin America. Amazon can compete effectively in Latin America, but replicating Mercado Libre’s accumulated ecosystem economics would require years of localized infrastructure, payments data, credit underwriting, logistics density and consumer behavior. MELI’s success stems from solving structural regional challenges. And Amazon’s playbook relies on high credit card penetration and reliable third-party carriers. MELI built a closed-loop financial system (Mercado Pago) for an underbanked population and constructed its own logistics network (Mercado Envíos), creating a local network effect Amazon could not replicate. Obviously, I'd say there are some key risks to monitor. A shift in macroeconomic conditions could impact the $16B+ credit portfolio. Management’s move upmarket has kept 15–90 day NPLs at 7.0%, but this metric requires continuous monitoring. Reporting in USD exposes reported results to translation headwinds from the Brazilian Real (BRL) and Argentine Peso (ARS). Short-term operating margins (e.g., 6.7% in Q2 2026) may fluctuate as the company invests in free-shipping thresholds, fulfillment centers, and credit card issuance. While short-term operating margins (e.g., 6.7% in Q2 2026) may face pressure from strategic investments in free-shipping thresholds and credit card issuance, this is a feature, not a bug. Looking ahead, my base case assumes net revenue to compound at 25–30% CAGR through 2028. As these upfront investments mature and credit underwriting scales, I expect operating margins to structurally recover toward 11–13%. And a price of $1,850 would be attractive for me to buy. Onto the next one. :)

Recent portfolio changes: 1.Added $JD 2.Made $EWZ $MTZ $VST my major positions 3.Added $LULU 4.Added $INTR

Time for that hug and gift again. $PDD https://t.co/53mk0AYYcz

$EWZ I probably wouldn’t bet against Stanley Druckenmiller. Now $EWZ is one of my largest position. :)

$VST Opened a small position. :)